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Hit by the Street: Dewey and Popular Culture 
Nakia S. Pope
The idea for this paper started with an image that is likely wholly imaginary but 
interesting nonetheless. It’s the late 1920s in New York City. John Dewey, after a 
busy day of teaching and working through the notes that will eventually become 
Individualism Old and New, leaves his office at Columbia University. Instead of 
turning south toward home, he turns north and east, into Harlem. He strolls for a bit, 
turns up 7th Ave., and stops in front of the Regent Theatre. He goes inside, takes off 
his coat, and catches the early showing of The Lights of New York. Fifty-seven minutes 
later, he leaves the Regent. He heads home, has a bite to eat with his daughter, but 
still feels restless. After dinner, he puts on his coat and hat and heads out again—
this time to 51st and Broadway, where a bandleader named Fletcher Henderson 
is playing at a club called Roseland. Dewey stands in the back, bespectacled and 
moustached, and watches the people dance to this new music called jazz. Maybe 
he even has a drink . . . .
I am not sure this ever happened, but it makes a compelling image, at least for 
someone who is interested in Dewey’s aesthetics. Dewey lived in one of the artistic 
centers of the world during the emergence of two significant forms of popular art 
that remain huge influences on our culture—jazz and film. Dewey also did not tackle 
aesthetics until relatively late in his career. First, there was a chapter on “Experience, 
Nature, and Art” in Experience and Nature (1925). Later, after criticism from Lewis 
Mumford and prompting from Albert Barnes, Dewey published his thorough 
treatment of the philosophy of art in 1934 as Art as Experience. In both works, 
Dewey advanced a view of aesthetics that is sensitive to the role social class plays 
in traditional conceptions of aesthetics. He attempts to overcome this tradition by 
radically refocusing aesthetics from art objects to aesthetic experience. Aesthetic 
experience is marked by continuity, in which various aspects of our experience 
that are often separated, such as mind and body, reason and affect, and means and 
ends, are brought together. 
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In what follows, I will briefly outline Dewey’s aesthetics with an eye toward the 
role of social class within his theory of aesthetic experience. Then, I will delve briefly 
into Dewey’s views on film as an example of the complexities Dewey’s aesthetics 
provides for a theory of popular art. Dewey was seemingly dismissive of film and 
other forms of popular art, despite a developing aesthetic theory that would seem to 
encompass such forms. Such dismissiveness seems to arise from these class concerns. 
Popular art is produced for economic reasons and consumed for escapist ones. Just 
because Dewey was sensitive to the role class plays in the division between fine and 
popular art does not mean he embraced the emerging popular arts of his day. I see 
this as a tension within Dewey’s own writings—a tension between the social class 
dynamics of art and the potentiality of aesthetic experience inherent everywhere. 
This tension seems to be somewhat out of place, if only because Dewey was very 
concerned with demonstrating the aesthetic potentiality of “merely” utilitarian 
objects such as buildings or pots. Finally, I will offer some contemporary examples 
of how Dewey’s aesthetics is used to engage elements of popular culture. Both John 
McDermott and Richard Shusterman recognize that a Deweyan aesthetic provides 
valuable conceptual resources for critique and understanding of popular art. Thus, 
McDermott and Shusterman move Dewey along, overcoming the unresolved ten-
sion Dewey left in his own aesthetics. Taking popular art seriously is important, for 
it is one of the major social forces that has considerable educational influence; we 
must reckon with popular art if we are serious about human growth and flourishing. 
In the preface to the 1929 version of Experience and Nature, Dewey is clear that 
his emerging theory of aesthetic experience seeks to bridge gaps. The primary gap is 
between, as the title of the work suggests, experience and nature. The gap between 
how the world is and how we live in it is a significant philosophical one, one Dewey 
seeks to mitigate throughout the work. Art plays a central role in this mitigation, as 
certain views of art (“art for art’s sake”) see it as something completely separate from 
other attempts to engage and utilize nature. Science is seen as objective, rational, 
apprehending nature in its true form while art is seen as subjective, emotional, and 
an expressive reflection of and “addition to” nature (LW 1). Science is to be used, 
while art is to be enjoyed. Science is means, while art is merely an end. 
Art, then, is simply an end in itself. It exists for no other purpose save 
expression and enjoyment. Thus, objects that serve direct purposes—pots, shovels, 
dwellings—are not art. They serve other purposes—to cook, to move dirt, to keep 
us warm and dry —and are thus too utilitarian to be art. They are, to put it another 
way, dirty and normal. They are also tools, used primarily by members of lower 
social classes to merely make a living. 
This is one of the many dichotomies Dewey is seeking to overcome. He wants 
to reorient aesthetic theory away from its focus on a certain class of nonuseful objects 
and toward objects that contribute to aesthetic experience. Aesthetic experiences 
are characterized by continuity; the objects therein are characterized by continuity 
between various aspects of experience that are often separated—ends and means, 
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mind and body, ideal and real. Such aesthetic objects demonstrate the conditions 
that allowed the object to be created. They are a stand-in in certain ways for the 
historical, social, and environmental forces that define our experience. They also 
turn us outward or forward, allowing us to reflect on previous experiences and 
have future experiences in a different way. The immediate enjoyment, the future 
experience, and the past conditions all come together. This happens in at least some 
experience, but art can facilitate and embody this continuity. Th is continuity be-
comes the primary feature of the aesthetic for Dewey: “The distinguishing feature of 
conscious experience . . . is that in it the instrumental and the final, meanings that 
are signs and clews [sic] and meanings that are immediately possessed, suffered, 
and enjoyed come together in one. And all of these things are preeminently true of 
art” (LW 1: 269). Dewey calls these unified experiences “consummatory.” They are 
rare, given the divergent and distracting nature of our world. Yet they are vital for 
our quality of life (LW 10). 
It is not objects of “fine art” alone that facilitate these consummatory 
experiences. Paintings in museums or music offered by symphonies are not the 
only objects that express this continuity. Dewey is very critical of those who see 
objects that are useful as lacking any aesthetic possibility. He also explicitly connects 
the separation of art into “fine” and “useful” categories with social class: “Then 
there is that which in quantity bulks most largely as fine art . . . a production which 
in reality is largely a form of commercialized industry in production of a class of 
commodities that find their sale among well-to-do-persons desirous of maintaining 
a conventionally approved status” (LW 1: 273). This status maintenance is important, 
because the status it represents is at a distance from the means of production and 
an ability to appreciate the ends. Later in the same paragraph, Dewey makes this 
explicit: “Its products remind their owner of things pleasant in memory though 
hard in direct undergoing, and remind others that their owner has achieved an 
economic standard which makes possible cultivation and decoration of leisure” 
(LW 1: 273). We consume “fine” art in order to wistfully remember days gone by 
without having to relive the difficulties of those days. Fine art also serves to let others 
know we are of such a status that we never have to engage with dirty, normal world 
of useful things any longer. 
It may sound like Dewey is engaging in some sort of art class warfare, but he is 
not just criticizing a social phenomenon, but a metaphysical one—the separation of 
experience into completely separate spheres for instrumentality and consummation. 
In one section of Experience and Nature, he begins in social class but ends in 
education, at least if we conceive of education as the making of meaning. One, if 
not the principle, goal of education is to enable individuals to continually enrich 
their own lives through transaction with everyday experience. Dewey says: “The 
traditional separation of some things as mere means and others as mere ends is a 
reflection of the insulated existence of working and leisure classes, of production 
that is not also consummatory and comsummation that is not productive. This 
Hit by the Street: Dewey and Popular Culture    29
Volume 27 (1)  2011
division is not a merely social phenomenon.” It reflects, for Dewey, what may be 
“the problem of experience” which is taking experience that only seems to have 
causal connections and forging meaning: “When that task is achieved the result is 
art and in art everything is common between means and ends” (LW 1: 277). The 
split between fine art and useful objects, just like the split between producers and 
consumers, arises from a misplaced ascription of meaning to only those things that 
are seen as consummatory and a neglect of the instrumental. Art and class mirror 
our ignorance of the necessary continuity between means and ends. 
Given these factors, it would seem reasonable that Dewey would engage with 
popular art. After all, popular art is, by definition, not the domain of the upper class. 
Yet in Art as Experience his major examples of form and function are all works of 
art that are typically regarded as “fine,” even if historically they were once used for 
more utilitarian purposes (as were Grecian urns). He speaks often of the poetry of 
Keats, but doesn’t mention Whitman. The work has photos of paintings by El Greco, 
Cezanne, and Matisse, but says nothing about film. There is a symphony, but no jazz 
(LW 10). If, as Dewey suggests, he is trying to remove art from the museum, then why 
are his examples all museum pieces? This is the same Dewey who says “the growth 
of capitalism has been a powerful influence in the development of the museum as 
the proper home for works of art, and in the promotion of the idea that they are 
apart from the common life” (LW 10: 14). Yet Dewey goes to the museum time and 
time again, even if it is to bring those pieces out to the common life. Why does he 
not consider the living, vibrant art that was literally emerging on his doorstep? 
One historical reason may be the influence of Albert Barnes. Barnes was a 
chemist and a doctor who developed a type of silver nitrate solution that led to 
Barnes becoming very, very wealthy. At the age of 45, Barnes enrolled in one of 
Dewey’s seminars at Columbia in 1917-1918. After this course, Barnes and Dewey 
became close friends. Barnes’s wealth enabled him to amass a significant collection 
of art, the bulk of which was the contemporary (for the time) post-impressionist 
work of Degas, Cezanne, Matisse, and other French painters. Barnes was not merely 
a private collector, but rather wanted his purchases to be used for education. This 
led him to Dewey’s seminar and later to appoint Dewey as the educational advisor 
of the Barnes Foundation. On several occasions, Barnes took Dewey to the art 
museums of Europe and eventually left a healthy stipend to Dewey after his death 
in 1951 (Dykhuizen, 1973; Dalton, 2002). Undoubtedly, Barnes had significant 
influence on Dewey’s aesthetics. 
Dewey dedicated Art as Experience to Barnes; it was the Barnes Foundation 
that first published the work. In the preface, Dewey writes “My greatest indebtedness 
is to Dr. A. C. Barnes.” He notes that Barnes went over every chapter of the work 
and that his conversations with Barnes “together with that of his books, has been a 
chief factor in shaping my own thinking about the philosophy of aesthetics” (LW 10: 
4). The photos contained in the work all come from pieces in the Barnes collection. 
Dewey wrote about what he saw and what he knew; when he looked for examples 
of works of art to include in his aesthetics, those examples were supplied by Barnes. 
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Barnes himself was, by all accounts, “a difficult man” (Westbrook, 1991, p. 
388). This difficulty emerged in his attitude concerning art and art education. His 
own aesthetics seemed radically different from Dewey’s, centering on formalism 
and objectivity. He downplayed the transactionary role of art, nor was there 
much emphasis on continuity that marked Dewey’s attempts to describe aesthetic 
experience. Indeed, Barnes seemed to frequently misread Dewey, as when he focused 
on the criteria for distinguishing good from bad art he claimed to derive from 
Experience and Nature (Dalton, 2002). It wasn’t Dewey’s aesthetic theory that Barnes 
appropriated, however. Barnes found, at least in Dewey’s writings, the same sense 
of class and art that marked his own practices with his foundation. 
The Barnes Foundation was anti-museum and anti-art establishment. Barnes 
was notorious for denying admission to the collection to the wealthy or influential 
and granting it to those not immersed in the art world (Westbrook, 1991). This anti-
establishment stance of Barnes may be due in part to his favored artistic subject 
matter. Barnes focused heavily on the impressionist and post-impressionist artists 
of Europe; this was the modern art of his day. As such, it (and Barnes, whose long-
standing interest in art was only recently coupled with his “new money”) was often 
derided by the American art establishment. The artists that Barnes favored were 
ignored or thoroughly criticized by most Americans; Barnes just poured fuel on 
the fire by being overtly hostile to anyone who was critical of his collection (Dalton, 
2002). 
While the issues of social class and the museum character of fine art were 
present in Dewey before Barnes’s inf luence, one can see how Barnes and his 
collection made these issues even more complex. Barnes was thoroughly (and, 
perhaps, paradoxically) democratic in his views about art and art access. He was 
also adventurous and in some ways prescient with his collector’s eye (Dalton, 2002). 
Dewey may have absorbed both Barnes’s anti-establishment tendencies and his 
artistic preferences during their friendship. Although Barnes was acknowledged to 
be very interested in African and African American art, Barnes did not seem to be 
interested in the emerging popular art forms of the times (Ryan, 1995). Although 
in some ways their focus on modern art was a stretch from the established subjects 
for aesthetics, Matisse was not Frank Capra; the average New Yorker was much 
more likely to have seen It Happened One Night than to have viewed The Dance. 
Nevertheless, Matisse and the other artists patronized by Barnes stretched the 
boundaries of the aesthetics of the day. 
It may be possible that Barnes’s influence kept Dewey from examining the 
popular art of his day. There are other possibilities as well. Dewey had his own 
prejudices on the matter, of course. Plus, he was getting old. Dewey turned 71 in 
1930; he may have found it hard to jitterbug at Roseland. There are also philosophical 
and cultural reasons. One of the central dichotomies he attempted to resolve in his 
aesthetics was between art for art’s sake and created objects that were immediately 
useful. Key to this resolution was acknowledging the continuity present in art that 
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led to the consummatory. Popular art, such as film, was neither very fi ne nor obvi-
ously useful. It was not a painting designed to be sublime, nor was it a functional 
tool like a pot. It was, at some level, supposed to entertain. This end of popular art 
was also coupled with another end—profit. The entertainment function and profit 
motive of popular art such as film made Dewey more than a little skeptical of its 
consummatory potential, especially given that such popular art was merely con-
sumed by the lower class.
When Dewey did speak of film or other forms of popular art, he expressed 
his worry that such arts were unintelligent, in the sense that they expressed a 
separation of means and ends (Seng, 2007). Popular art was created to distract and 
entertain consumers while making money for producers. The consumerist (in both 
emotional and economic terms) impulse was a concern for Dewey, for it threatened 
the deliberation and intelligent action necessary for democratic life. Thus, he was 
skeptical of popular art. In Politics and Culture, he writes, “Adverse opinions as to 
the possibility of a general democratic culture are also based on the low standards, 
intellectually and aesthetically, of the radio, the movie, and the popular theatre. 
Is there not a possibility that the standards of things are low ultimately (I think 
we all agree that they are much lower than they ought to be) ultimately because of 
economic causes?” (LW 6: 44). 
These economic causes stem from the split between ends and means that 
threatens democratic life and makes fine art the domain of the upper classes. This 
separation, mirrored in the social split between producers and consumers, results 
in two types of art: popular art for the workers and fine art for those of leisure. The 
fine/popular art split is symptomatic of the deeper metaphysical and cultural split 
Dewey seeks to overcome in Experience and Nature. The ordinary worker goes to 
movies because he is disconnected from the aesthetic continuity in his everyday life. 
This is a problem for Dewey, who remarks, “a civilization, in which the average man 
spends his day in a factory and his evening at a movie, has still a long way to go” (LW 
7: 434). The problem, again, is discontinuity. Popular art displays the discontinuity 
because it is produced for economic consumption, not aesthetic experience. Popular 
art arises in a social system that itself is discontinuous, where most of the population 
is disconnected from the deep democratic life Dewey advocates. 
Given this state of affairs, two possibilities emerge. Either popular art can be 
refined to better display the continuity that marks aesthetic experience or the social 
situation can be altered so that the experience of most of us has a higher degree 
of continuity. The fine arts serve as both means and end for the latter possibility, 
which seems to be the one Dewey prefers. Seng remarks that “Dewey’s aim is not the 
improvement of movies themselves as an art form, but a more critical, intelligent 
public. Education is his desire, and as this ideal becomes realized he believes people 
will gain more interest in the traditionally fine arts” (2007, p. 6). Seng bases his 
assessment on Dewey’s statements in the Ethics, where Dewey discusses improvement 
in aesthetic standards and knowing “good” art (LW 7). If more educational and 
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social options were provided to the public, more people would be able to develop 
the capacity to integrate the aesthetic into their everyday lives. If such art was better 
integrated into mainstream social life, instead of being removed to the museum, 
then this sort of aesthetic education would be easier. Dewey does not follow up on 
the possibility that the forms of art that were already part of mainstream social 
life—popular arts such as film—already have aesthetic value.
Despite his aesthetics, Dewey seems dismissive of popular art. He does not 
seem to even consider the possibility that the emerging forms of popular art, such 
as film, could be a mechanism for promoting the continuity of experience he seeks. 
That may be the result of old prejudices about art dying hard. Film, for example, was 
a relatively new expressive form during Dewey’s time and had not yet proven itself 
as an art form. One wonders, however, why this matters, given Dewey’s insistence 
that objects typically seen as instrumental also had aesthetic value. If a pot could 
express the continuity of experience, why not a film? Dewey was also clearly worried 
about the economic entanglements involved in film and other forms of popular art. 
Films were made to make money, not to provoke, inspire, and unify. This seemingly 
taints them in some way for Dewey. But two issues remain. First, it seems naïve 
for Dewey to ignore the economic function of the production of anything, given 
the social intelligence he displayed and promoted. Films were the products of and 
participants in an economic system. But so are pots, shovels, and Impressionist 
paintings. Second, if Dewey wants to claim that we should dismiss popular art 
because of the economic intent behind its production, then that leads us to the 
very thorny problem of creator intent and the function of art. How much does 
intent matter in our interpretation of a work? I am not sure Dewey wants to go 
down that road, especially given his arguments about the importance of seemingly 
instrumental objects. The intent of the pot is not just to represent the continuity of 
experience. It’s also to boil water.  For Dewey to dismiss films or other elements of 
popular art because the intent of the products is to make their producers money 
seems a bit contradictory. 
Is there a way out? Can we put Dewey in the movie theater or jazz hall in 
good conscience? Dewey certainly went to the movies (Seng, 2007). But his attitudes 
about art seemed shaped more by Barnes than the street life of New York City. This 
is understandable, even as it is a bit disappointing. Dewey himself seems a bit stuck 
in his neglect of popular art, due to a variety of factors such as the influence of 
Barnes. Dewey’s aesthetics, however, can serve as a rich resource for involvement 
in and understanding of popular art forms, if someone can take it up and move 
Dewey along. John J. McDermott does it with architecture and late twentieth-cen-
tury modern art. Richard Shusterman uses Dewey’s aesthetics to discuss rock and 
roll and hip-hop (McDermott,1976; Shusterman, 2000). Both of these authors take 
Dewey’s aesthetics and apply it to contemporary and popular artistic developments. 
McDermott is a notable commenter on Dewey and sees Dewey’s aesthetics 
as central not only to understanding Dewey’s philosophical project, but also to 
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fully understanding aesthetic developments in modern culture. According to 
McDermott, only the pragmatism of Dewey and James contains the tools to reckon 
with the significant changes wrought during the twentieth century in both the art 
world and American culture writ large. This project—deploying philosophical tools 
to understand and enrich our cultural transactions—is one that most of philosophy 
has abandoned, but one that is necessary if we are concerned with the betterment 
of lives. 
In his essay, “To Be Human is to Humanize: A Radically Empirical Aesthetic,” 
McDermott claims that only the empiricism provided by James and Dewey give 
us the conceptual tools to fully understand modern art: “Dewey’s views [in Art as 
Experience] provide a point of departure for a contemporary aesthetic, rooted in 
the very fabric of the human condition and capable of transforming our cultural 
attitudes» (1976, p. 45). This is because both pragmatist empiricism and modern art 
share a central way of understanding the world.  We live in a world where making, 
not representing, is the central human task. Central to the emergence of modern art 
is the attitude that people both constitute and construct their own reality. Process 
is key—not just the process of making art, but the process of making anything and 
everything, as everything is made. The focus on the process of making —a focus 
on medium and technique as much as a finished product—that McDermott sees 
in modern art mirrors the larger philosophical claim that being itself is a process. 
We (as individuals, as a culture, as entities) are not finished, ever. Flux is the norm, 
with stability only being temporary. 
In the essay, McDermott compares the empiricism of James with the 
impressionism of Monet. This was the same genre of art that Dewey was exposed 
to via Barnes. According to McDermott, modern art provides us with two vital 
philosophical perspectives. First, nature is no longer our primary creative referent, 
in art or in life. The accurate representation of fixed forms is no longer the goal. 
In philosophy, pragmatism moves us away from the attempt to accurately mirror 
nature to a more instrumental concern with how we transact with the various 
forms within our environment. Second, modern art objects are best seen as 
events, not as fixed entities. As events, entities become relational. They tie together 
historical dimensions of experience, such as the artist’s context and the context 
of the art world, with our present viewing, where we supply our own context and 
circumstance. Modern art invites participation. The blurred contours of a Monet 
painting asks us to become involved in the painting itself, just as the street theater 
or other happenings erupt around us, drawing us into direct participation with 
the event. We carry that experience of participation forward into the future, where 
it becomes part of our context for the having of subsequent experience. This, of 
course, is Dewey’s emphasis on continuity—the unity of past, present and future that 
art facilitates. But it is continutity that Dewey seeks in all experience, not just the 
experience of traditional works of art. McDermott speaks to this Deweyan theme, 
and moves closer to considering a Deweyan perspective on popular art when he 
considers the Rodia towers in Watts. 
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The Rodia towers are a prime example of the Deweyan themes in modern art 
that McDermont wishes to highlight. They are assembled, literally put together, from 
common household materials that many would consider trash. Rising in a lower 
class neighborhood and constructed by a working class immigrant, the towers give 
embodiment to the Deweyan idea that “any material, found or constructed, can be 
aesthetically meaningful” (McDermott, 1976, p. 48). Aesthetic value does not come 
from what the towers are made of, it comes from what the towers do in the present. 
As nonrepresentational art that was under construction over a period of years, the 
towers avoid the nostalgia that McDermott claims drives so much of high art. The 
towers don’t attempt to accurately portray some past event, recreating it for present 
viewers. Instead, they stand as a never-quite-completed invitation. The towers, and 
by extention all modern art, become less about presenting the past and more about 
making something in the present. The past, in the form cast-off materials, still 
emerges in the towers; they have the potential to foster the continuity of experience 
that Dewey claims must be present in the aesthetic, but they are not captive to a 
stagnant nostalgia. Given the materials of their construction, the background of 
the artist, the neighborhood they inhabit, and their form and presence, the Rodia 
towers are an example of arts movement from museum to the street. According to 
McDermott, a pragmatist aesthetic is the only aesthetic capable of reckoning with 
this movement. 
Shusterman follows McDermott in claiming that a pragmatist aesthetic is 
the best tool for understanding modern art, though Shusterman goes further. 
McDermott’s examples are, for the most part, still fine art in the broad sense of 
the term. They are paintings and sculptures, much like Dewey’s examples in Art as 
Experience. With the exception of jazz, which still maintains a sightly rareified air, 
McDermott does not consider popular art. The Rodia towers, even as they are made 
with found materials by a working class artist, are still a sculpture. Shusterman 
helps us apply Dewey’s aesthetic to popular art forms—film and, most directly, 
popular music. 
Shusterman stands as one of the primary defenders of both a pragmatist 
aesthetic and of the artistic merits of popular art. For Shusterman, these two are 
inextricably linked, for a pragmatist aesthetic provides us with both the means 
and motivation to take popular forms of artistic expression seriously. In many 
ways, Shusterman takes Dewey farther than Dewey himself. While I cannot fully 
summarize and critique Shusterman’s aesthetics and views on popular art here, I 
will point out several lines of continuity between Shusterman and Dewey regarding 
popular culture in order to demonstrate that, while he may have fallen a bit short 
of taking popular culture seriously, Dewey’s aesthetics provides Shusterman (and 
us) with the conceptual and educational resources to reckon with these vital and 
omnipresent cultural products.
Shusterman’s articulation of a pragmatist aesthetic of popular art comes in 
several forms, but the most significant is his defense of popular art against traditional 
aesthetics. Consider, for example, Dewey’s own claim that “adverse opinions as to 
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the possibility of a general democratic culture are also based on the low standards, 
intellectually and aesthetically, of the radio, the movie, and the popular theatre. Is 
there not a possibility that the standards of things are low ultimately (I think we all 
agree that they are much lower than they ought to be) ultimately because of economic 
causes?” (LW 6: 44). Dewey’s own claim that popular art has low standards mirrors 
the common complaints that popular art is simple and uncreative. Shusterman 
deals with both of these complaints against popular art in a very Deweyan manner. 
A common complaint about popular art is that it cannot deal with the messy 
complexities of life, as such art must be simplified for mass consumption. Real family 
problems do not get neatly resolved in twenty-two minutes. Nor can the roller-
coaster ride that is falling in love be summed up in a hundred-and-eight-minute 
film. Pretty in Pink deals with social class, love, and growing up all fairly succinctly 
and superficually. This may all be true of some popular films and other forms of 
popular art. Shusterman notes, however, that the claim of simplicity does not hold 
for all popular art. Popular art can be complex; just because some of it is banal does 
not mean all of it is. Consider, for example, two recent summer blockbuster films, 
The Dark Knight and Watchmen. Both are films based on comic books. Both were 
hugely popular, making significant money at the box office. Yet both contain layers 
of complexity. Each tries to grapple with the price individuals and society are willing 
to pay for security and the burdens we place on those we choose to protect us. Fear 
is a common theme in both films. In addition to these thematic elements, they are 
replete with symbolism, both the broad symbolic play of art in general and a more 
specific symbolic language desgined to appeal to individuals versed in their source 
material. Watchmen, in particular, is a film based on a comic book that is largely 
about the specific tropes of comic books. Readers of the books notice things others do 
not. These films, then, operate on multiple levels. They are summer entertainment, 
but they are also explorations of social themes using a particular set of signs and 
symbols. These films are complex while being popular. 
Are they as complex as other forms of fine art? Even if they are, does the 
average viewer notice these complexities? Shusterman says that these questions, 
ultimately, express a deep-seated class bias. Here, he sounds very Deweyan. 
Shusterman’s answer to both questions is “maybe.” But such an answer isn’t meant 
to be evasive or ambivalent. His “maybe” stems from two observations. First, he 
notes that both fine and popular art contain complexities that are missed by the 
viewer. I may have liked The Dark Knight for the explosions and action; I may have 
the print of Rothko’s No. 13 in my living room because it matches my curtains. In 
either case, my level of appreciation or understanding of a piece of art doesn’t mean 
that there isn’t more going on with that piece. Shusterman’s second observation is 
that such dismissal often rests on a conflation of the new and the difficult—what is 
percieved as complex—with what is relevant or significant. High art is often given 
that status because it as seen as more significant. Its complexity supposedly allows 
it to represent and critique elements of our human experience. But our fundamental 
experiences are often our most familiar experiences. The conflation of the difficult 
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with the complex and thus significant “is refuted by the abiding significance that 
our more familiar experiences and traditional forms (e.g., falling in love, kissing 
our children good-night, holiday prayers and meals) often have in our lives” (2000, 
p. 187). For most people, the relevant and significant are the things we deal with 
everyday. 
Shusterman’s point is that to equate good art with that which is new and 
difficult betrays a deeper politcal disdain for the reality of the common person: “This 
is surely a convenient strategy for the priviledged and conservative to ignore and 
suppress the realities of those they dominate by denying the artistic legitimacy of 
their expression” (2000, p. 187).  Fine art ignores the concerns and lives of ordinary 
citizens, as those concerns and those citizens aren’t particularly worth much. While 
I certainly think it’s incorrect to say Dewey was dismissive of the concerns of the 
common person, Dewey seems to be skeptical that the popular art consumed by 
the common person has much to offer. When such art reflects the concerns of the 
common person, however, Shusterman says it must be considered, lest we ignore the 
everyday reality most of us face. Many popular artists, such as Bruce Springsteen, 
would agree: “Poverty and violence, sex and drugs, ‘spare parts and broken hearts’ 
(to quote Bruce Springsteen) ‘keep this world turnin’ around’; and they have a way 
of reasserting their repressed reality with a brutal vengeance, as one departs the 
theater and is hit by the street” (Shusterman, 2000, p. 187). 
Dewey may have ignored the street, but he was clearly concerned with the 
class bias he saw as inherent within aesthetics and the art world. The legitimation 
of certain objects as fine art was primarily due to the maintenance of class status. 
Objects that had use were not seen as legitmate candidates for designation as art, 
as they drifted too close to the means of production. Class separation mirrored 
an ethical and metaphysical separation—the intellectual and aesthetic concerns 
of the upper class, concerns that the majority of people simply did not have, are 
more valuable and real that the concerns of the average or marginalized person. 
The gallery and museum (but not, perhaps, the movie house), “reflect and establish 
superior cultural status, while their segregation from the common life reflects the 
fact that they are not part of a native and spontaneous culture. They are a kind of 
counterpart to a holier-than-thou attitude, exhibited not toward persons as such but 
toward the interests and occupations that absorb most of the communities time and 
energy” (LW 10: 14-15). Shusterman, however, goes further, explicitly connecting 
the aesthetic disregard for popular art with an attempt to at best ignore and at worst, 
further repress, the concerns of those who lack much social power.
Shusterman’s defense of popular art against the claim that it lacks creativity 
also rests on Dewey’s aesthetic insights. Popular art supposedly lacks any aesthetic 
value because it’s produced by groups for groups; it is mass produced so it can be 
mass consumed. A committee of Hollywood executives, armed with reams of focus 
group and test screening data, put together a film designed to appeal to the broadest 
audience possible in order to make the most money possible. Thus, popular art lacks 
the creative spark of individuality and expression that marks fine art.
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Shusterman’s defense, while multifaceted, rests on the Deweyan notion 
that all communication is fundamentally communal. In order to communicate 
anything, an audience must be anticipated. This is as true for the lone artist as 
it is for the Hollywood committee. The devil, of course, is in the details. What is 
to be communicated, to whom, and for what purpose? But these are pragmatic, 
situational concerns. They are not grounds for dismissing the entirety of popular art. 
Movies do get made by committee and some of those movies are boring, uninspired, 
simplistic, commercial pap. But fine art gets made by individuals and some of 
that art is boring, uninspired, overly dense, impenetrable pap. We cannot exclude 
communally produced works (there goes all film, theater, and architecture!) or 
works that anticipate an audience (there goes everything, at least if we take Dewey 
seriously) from aesthetic consideration. Nor can we exclude works that are produced 
to be sold. Even Dewey notes that “works of art are now produced, like other articles, 
for sale in the market” (LW 10: 15). Dewey is critical of this sort of production and 
its inorganic nature. Art ought to arise from the life of the community. Popular art 
has just as much opportunity to be organic in this way as does fine art.
Shusterman’s articulation of the aesthetic potential of popular art ranges 
far beyond what is covered here. He defends popular art against charges that it 
places content over form, by noting examples of popular art that are self-conscious 
about their status as representation. He points out that many works of fine art are 
as temporary or transient as much of popular art is supposed to be. Popular art 
can also be physically enjoyed—we can dance! Those dismissive of popular art 
as intellectually empty not only neglect the intellectual content that is present in 
popular art, they also neglect the fact that art can be enjoyed in ways that are not 
intellectual. They privilege the mind over the body, betraying (again) a class bias and 
a Cartesean dualism that Shusterman and Dewey work to overcome (Shusterman, 
2000). Dewey works to overcome it with his emphasis on the unity of art and aes-
thetic experience. Shusterman goes further, however, directly addressing the mean-
ing that is potentially present within popular art. 
Why does all this matter? Why is Dewey’s stance (or lack thereof) on popular 
art important? First, we swim in popular art. If, as Dewey, McDermott, and 
Shusterman argue, philosophy ought to be employed to examine elements of our 
contemporary situation, then the aesthetic measure of popular art has to be taken, 
and taken seriously. McDermott notes that the influence of modern art is pervasive—
in our furniture, our home design, even our kitchen appliances (McDermott, 1976). 
Popular art is even more embedded in our experience; it is the majority of our 
cultural context. McDermott’s defense of pragmatism as the best way to reckon 
with modern art can easily be applied to popular art, particularly his assertion 
that pragmatism allows us to see that art has moved beyond representation and is 
primarily concerned with construction. This construction, done by individuals who 
are often on the social margins, allows a more democratic participation in what 
constitutes art and demonstrates the sort of continuity that Dewey places at the 
center of aesthetic experience. Like Dewey, McDermott does not directly address 
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popular art, but by placing pragmatism at the center of an aesthetic understanding 
of our contemporary situation, he serves as a transitional figure to Shusterman. 
McDermott moves Dewey along, getting him closer to the movie theater 
and nightclub, even as Dewey is reluctant to go. Dewey’s reluctance to enter into 
a direct dialog with popular art stems from worries about the emptiness of com-
mercially produced and consumed popular art that, I have argued, are slightly out 
of place, especially given the place social class occupies in his aesthetic concerns. 
It is Shusterman who buys Dewey his ticket and takes him inside. Whereas Dewey 
argued that it was largely a class bias that led to the dismissal of useful objects from 
the aesthetic realm, Shusterman argues that is the same sort of bias that leads to a 
dismissal of popular art from the aesthetic realm.
Like McDermott, Shusterman sees Dewey’s pragmatism as the best means 
for addressing our contemporary aesthetic situation, only in Shusterman’s case 
this situation is often of popular art. Shusteman’s basic reason for addressing such 
art is simple: popular art gives us pleasure. We listen, we dance, we have a good 
time. While even I find it difficult, in my initial fictional Dewey outing, to picture 
him dancing, the fact that we seek out elements of our experience because they 
are enjoyable did not escape Dewey. Such a vital part of our experience cannot be 
constantly derided or condemned without dividing ourselves between that part 
which guiltily enjoys the latest Roots album and the part which says we need to get 
busy reading more philosophy. For Shusterman, the dismissal of popular art is the 
dismissal of the everyday reality most of us inhabit. Such as dismissal amounts to 
an attempt to control that reality by those in power (Shusterman, 2000). If nothing 
else, Dewey’s work is an attempt to overcome the philosphical dichotomies that 
result in harmful social divisions. The split between fine and popular art is one of 
those harmful divisions, resulting in a kind of disdain to certain parts of ourselves 
and to certain classes of people. Finally, there are significant educational reasons 
to deploy aesthetic resources in analyses and defenses of popular art. Most of the 
attacks on popular art that Shusterman notes from Bloom, Adorno, Bordieu, and 
others are, at root, educational attacks—popular art is bad because it has pernicious 
effects on human growth. Shusterman and McDermott say this is not necessarily 
true; popular art has the potential to contribute to human growth and flourishing. 
Dewey, whose aesthetics and educational philosophy are drawn from the same core 
of continuity, provides us with the means to honestly reckon with the challenges 
and potentialities that popular art poses to us. Dewey’s aesthetic legacy is that art 
is not some predefined category, but can be found in any area of our experience 
where the continuity of ends and means, past and future, production and enjoyment 
is expressed. That is certainly true of film and other popular art forms. Dewey, I 
think, helps get us to that realization. 
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